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1. Let us assume that a faculty of language exists, a human cognitive capacity
that is the object of study of formal linguistics (Chomsky, 2005). The faculty of
language is what allows humans to produce and interpret linguistic utterances,
and since thenumber of theseutterances is inﬁnite, the faculty of languagemust
include a generative system.
2. In describing this generative system, formal linguistics makes use of a tech-
nical vocabulary, in terms of which aspects of the generative process are de-
ﬁned (such as Merge, a process combining elements, and Move, a process re-
deﬁning an element’s position), including a nomenclature for elements gener-
ated and their position (such as VP and Spec,TP). The question I want to raise
here is whether the elements denoted by this vocabulary are in any sense real.
3. At ﬁrst glance it may seem pointless to ﬁrst assume the reality of the gener-
ative system, and then doubt the reality of Merge, Move, VP, or Spec,TP. Espe-
cially if we arewilling to grant that the properties of the faculty of language have
been described successfully with the use of concepts like Merge, Move, VP and
Spec,TP. But there is a parallel here with the natural sciences, which have been
phenomenally successful in describing the physical world using the concepts of
mathematics, such as numbers, functions, and sets, and still there is a debate in
the philosophy ofmathematics as to the reality of thesemathematical concepts
(Leng, 2010).
4. In the philosophy of mathematics, an opposition exists between platonism
and ﬁctionalism, the former accepting the existence of numbers, sets, and re-
lations as abstract objects, the latter denying the existence of abstract objects,
andhence also the existenceof numbers, sets, and relations (seeBalaguer (2011)
for anoverviewofﬁctionalism in thephilosophyofmathematics). On theﬁction-
alist approach, the reason mathematics can still be successful in describing the
physicalworld, is thatmathematical concepts areﬁctions that function in thede-
scription of reality in the same way as metaphors function in everyday commu-
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nication. (For example, the location of Reggio Calabria in Italy can be described
metaphorically as ‘in the toe of the boot’, referring to the shape of Italy, and this
description can be as correct or false as any other; denying that the boot exists
does not aﬀect the existence of Reggio Calabria or our understanding of its lo-
cation.)
5. That the question of the reality of linguistic concepts is similar to the ques-
tion of the reality of mathematical concepts is suggested by the observation
thatMerge, as commonly understood, creates a set — a mathematical concept
e.g. Chomsky (2005, 11). Likewise, the hierarchical relations among syntactic
phrases can be described in terms of themereological relation of inclusion, itself
deﬁnable in set theoretical terms (Lewis, 1991). It stands to reason, then, that
linguistic concepts such as Merge, Move, VP and Spec,TP should be included in
the ﬁctionalism/platonism debate.
6. One way to interpret ﬁctionalism in mathematics is to hold that statements
about mathematical concepts (such as ‘4 is even’) cannot be true, since such
statements predicate over elements that are not real. However, even if we deny
the reality of mathematical concepts, there appears to be a qualitative diﬀer-
ence between statements like ‘4 is even’ and ‘a prime can be divided by 4’, a dif-
ference that hasbeendescribed in termsof truthor falsehood ‘within the storyof
mathematics’ (Field, 1998; Balaguer, 2009; Leng, 2010). While this leaves open
what that truth is grounded in, within the story of mathematics, we can assume
that it carries over to linguistics, so that the ﬁctionalist approach does not lead
to the conclusion that all statements of (formal) linguistics are a fortiori nonsen-
sical, as long as we understand what these statements are grounded in.
7. The faculty of language allows the language user to connect sound (or some
other externalizing modality) and meaning, not a trivial task. To analyze this
process for any given sentence, the formal linguist must come up with an opti-
mal resolution of the diverging or conﬂicting requirements of sound and mean-
ing representations. Call such a (hypothetical) resolution a syntax. As is well
known, the description of a sentence’s syntax in current formal linguistics is rife
withmetaphor, including the imagery of structure building (Merge) and transfor-
mation (Move). A ﬁctionalist approach to linguistics entails that these processes
(i.e.Merge andMove) are not in any sense real, even if they are part of a phenom-
enally successful analysis of the human faculty of language.
8. This is not to say that linguists should refrain fromemploying terms likeMerge
andMove in syntactic analysis. From a ﬁctionalist point of view, these processes
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aremetaphorical, and hence not real, even in themost successful scientiﬁc anal-
ysis of the faculty of language (which, as stated above, we assume is real and not
ﬁctitious). I am not arguing for an approach to syntax that does notmake use of
eitherMerge orMove or both. Our best attempts at describing linguistic reality
will inevitably make use of metaphorical concepts, just like our best attempts at
describing physical reality will inevitablymake use of themetaphorical concepts
of mathematics.
9. I do however see two nontrivial consequences of the ﬁctionalist approach to
linguistics. The ﬁrst consequence has to do with the vexing concept of ‘psycho-
logical reality’, and has implications for the transfer of linguistic analysis to adja-
cent disciplines such as psycholinguistics (including the study of the acquisition
of language) and neurolinguistics. A platonist approach to linguistic analysis,
when a phenomenon is described, say, in terms of ‘V-to-I movement’ or an ‘OV
base structure’, would lead to the expectation that these processes and conﬁg-
urations are detectable in psychological or neurological data. On a ﬁctionalist
approach, on the other hand, we do not expect any physical correlate of these
processes and conﬁgurations, as they merely function in a model of (a state of)
the facultyof language. (Theremaybe somecorrelate, butwehaveno ideawhat
it looks like, andwecan certainly not expect it to involve aphysical displacement,
for instance.)
10. The second consequence of the ﬁctionalist approach to linguistics has to do
with the evaluation of syntactic analyses. On a platonist approach to linguistic
analysis, where ‘V-to-I movement’ is real, the propriety of ‘V-to-I movement’ is
motivated in large part by the data (the position of V with respect to other ele-
ments indicating theeﬀect ofmovement). Onaﬁctionalist approach, thepropri-
ety of ‘V-to-I movement’ can only be motivated conceptually, i.e. by whatever
we believe truth ‘within the story of linguistics’ is grounded in.This is because
statements about elements and processes that feature in the analysis can only
be judged true (i.e.escape the verdict of being nonsensical) if they are somehow
inevitable within the conceptual framework.
11. I will not attempt here to be more concrete about what the concepts of lin-
guistic analysis should be grounded in. But the parallel with mathematics sug-
gests that there ought to be a basis to the ‘story of linguistics’ that has a similar
quality as the accepted mathematical axioms — to use the terminology of Field
(1998). To give a possible example, I have suggested elsewhere (Zwart, 2017)
that the generative procedure assumed in themodel of grammar involves a pro-
cess that turns an unordered setΣ— the Numeration of Chomsky (1995) — into
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anorderedn-tuple (Fortuny, 2008), essentiallybymergingα ∈ ΣwithΣ, yielding
{α, {α,β}} (if Σ = {α,β}), which is the set-theoretical deﬁnition of the ordered
pair< α,β > (Kuratowski, 1921); the operation can be repeated on any remain-
ing unordered set, yielding an ordered n-tuple in the end). In a similar vein, we
may assume that the number of primitives and concepts used in the model of
grammar is limited, explaining the predominance of recursion in the system, if
Jaspers (1998, 81) is correct.
12. If we assume that this is the process of structure building, both the process
and the structure can be described in terms that are grounded in more funda-
mental concepts outside the study of language, and in that sense inevitable. To
illustrate, note that the move from {α,β} to < α,β >, via {α, {α,β}} removes
the question of which ‘copy’ of α should be spelled out; the interpretive com-
ponents dealing with sound and meaning will see only the ordered pair, so that
the question of selective spell-out disappears; the ﬁctionalist approach, seeking
a fundamental grounding of the concepts used, allows here to make distinction
between grounded and ungrounded concepts, the former inevitable, the latter
artiﬁcial.
13. Chomsky (2005, 6) distinguishes three factors in language design, under-
stood as factors that enter into the growth of language in the individual (where
‘language’ is a stateof the facultyof language): genetic endowment, experience,
and principles not speciﬁc to the faculty of language. As examples of the third
factor, Chomsky suggests principles of data analysis, principles of structural ar-
chitecture and computational eﬃciency (Chomsky, 2005, 9). These factors enter
into the biological development of the faculty of language, which we assume to
be not ﬁctitious but real. On the other hand, our analysis of the faculty of lan-
guage, on the ﬁctionalist approach contemplated here, is inevitably amodel, i.e.
a system of description making use of essentially metaphorical concepts. The
parallel with the mathematics used in the analysis of the physical world, then,
suggests that for these concepts to be be used in a meaningful way, they need
to be grounded in something that has the quality of the inevitable, like axiomas
in mathematics. If so, third factor principles are the only ones relevant to the
construction of a model for linguistic analysis.
14. To conclude, I have suggested that it is possible to combine an essential-
ist approach to the faculty of language with a ﬁctionalist approach to linguistic
analysis, just like we can entertain a ﬁctionalist approach to mathematics with-
out denying the reality of the physical world. Needless to say, these are very
preliminary remarks, but I am encouraged to formulate them as I have not seen
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any other discussion of the relevance of the ﬁctionalism/platonism debate for
theoretical linguistics.
15. Dany Jaspers has shown uncommon friendship and interest inmywork from
the earliest days, and on several occasions I have been priviliged tomake crucial
use of his original insights and analyses. I feel honored to be included in this
congratulatory eﬀort.
Groningen, January 14, 2018
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